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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ernest E. Figari, Jr. *
A. Erin Dwyer**
Don Colleluori ***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions and statutory
enactments.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A number of cases during the Survey period measured the reach of the
Texas long-arm statute.' A recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures
International, Ltd.,2 considered an instructive variation of the usual use of
the statute.
In Polythane Systems a Texas manufacturer coupled the filing of a Texas
declaratory judgment action with the Texas long-arm statute to preempt the
filing elsewhere of product liability claims that had been threatened against
it. The two nonresident defendants, owners of marinas located in Maryland,
had constructed floating dock systems at those marinas utilizing foam pro-
duced and sold by the manufacturer. When the dock systems began losing
their buoyancy, the marina owners attributed the problem to the manufac-
turer's product. Upon being informed of the problem, the manufacturer
seized the initiative, filed a declaratory judgment action in Texas, and ef-
fected service on the marina owners using the long-arm statute. The marina
owners moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and, after the trial
court denied their motion, they asserted product liability counterclaims back
against the manufacturer. A trial on the merits subsequently resulted in a
judgment exonerating the manufacturer.
The marina owners appealed from the adverse judgment, contending that
the trial court, among other things, lacked personal jurisdiction. The Fifth
Circuit observed that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can
B.S., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist
University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
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*** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
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1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-45 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993)
(formerly TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985)).
2. 993 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1993).
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be general or specific; 3 however, it concluded that the defendants' contacts
with Texas did not support general jurisdiction.4
Focusing on specific jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit held that the marina
owners had purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting busi-
ness in Texas when they purchased and received delivery of the foam in
Texas and made payments to the manufacturer in Texas.5 The Fifth Circuit
emphasized that both the manufacturer's declaratory judgment action and
the marina owners' counterclaims arose from that sales relationship. 6 In
addressing the fairness of requiring the defendants to litigate such disputes in
Texas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the manufacturer, as the declaratory
judgment plaintiff, had an interest in ascertaining what liability it might have
had for the marinas' problems and a legitimate interest in defending its prod-
uct's reputation against claims that the foam was defective. 7 On this basis,
the Fifth Circuit sustained the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.8
Aviles v. Kunkle,9 another decision of the Fifth Circuit, addressed an unu-
sual use of the Texas long-arm statute by migrant farm workers in an at-
tempt to redress alleged violations of certain federal employment statutes.
Three groups of migrant farm workers, all of whom resided in Texas, filed
suit in Texas against two Ohio farmers and their foreman for federal employ-
ment claims arising out of their participation in the 1983 harvest at the de-
fendants' farm in Ohio.
The farmers, who were residents of Ohio and had no direct contact with
Texas, had employed the Texas workers to assist with their 1982 harvest
and, at its conclusion, offered them employment the following year in con-
nection with the 1983 harvest. When the time for the. 1983 harvest ap-
proached, a representative of the defendants telephoned the plaintiffs in
Texas and informed them when the harvest was expected to begin. Another
representative of the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs and suggested they
arrive in Ohio by a certain date to begin work. The plaintiffs arrived in Ohio
by the communicated date but were unable to start work for several weeks
because the crop was not ready. Later, complaining of their employment
conditions during the 1983 harvest, the plaintiffs filed suit in Texas and ef-
fected service on the defendants under the long-arm statute. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After finding no
3. 993 F.2d at 1205. " 'General jurisdiction' is personal jurisdiction based on a defend-
ant's contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the controversy. To exercise general juris-
diction, the court must determine whether 'the contacts are sufficiently systematic and
continuous as to support a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction.' " Southmark Corp. v. Life
Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). " 'Specific jurisdiction'
... is personal jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum that are related to the particular
controversy. Even a single purposeful contact may in a proper case be sufficient to meet the
requirement of minimum contacts when the cause of action arises from the contact." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
4. 993 F.2d at 1205.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1206.
8. Id.
9. 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992).
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basis for general jurisdiction, the trial court ruled that it had specific jurisdic-
tion over the defendants' person. This determination was, however, based
on a perceived partial performance of a contract in Texas, partial commis-
sion of a tort in Texas, and recruitment of Texas residents in Texas for em-
ployment outside the state. An appeal to the Fifth Circuit ensued. Focusing
on the three bases relied upon by the trial court, the Fifth Circuit observed
that "[s]uch actions can in some cases provide the requisite minimum con-
tacts permitting a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, but only if the asserted cause of action arises out of these 'con-
tacts.' "10 Continuing, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiffs'
claims were not based on any contract, tort, or recruitment in Texas, but
upon the alleged violation of two federal statutes arising out of employment
conditions in Ohio.I' In reversing the trial court's determination, the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs' federal claims arose out of their 1983 employ-
ment in Ohio, not out of any contacts upon which the trial court rested its
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 12 Thus, Aviles reiterates that, in order for
specific jurisdiction to be sustained, there must be a nexus between the con-
tacts relied upon and the claims asserted.
Joining with an earlier case, 13 Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp. 14 is an
indication that due process considerations cannot be satisfied solely by the
qualification of a nonresident corporation to transact business in the forum
state and its corresponding appointment of an agent there to receive service
of process. The plaintiff, a broker and a resident of Texas, brought suit in
Texas against a California corporation, which was the owner of certain gas
stations in Puerto Rico, claiming the corporation breached a commission
agreement covering a sale of those stations arranged by the plaintiff. Prior to
suit, the California corporation had qualified under the Texas Business Cor-
poration Act to transact business in Texas and appointed a Texas agent there
to receive service on its behalf. 15 When the plaintiff commenced suit he ap-
parently effected service over the nonresident corporation by serving its des-
ignated agent in Texas. The nonresident corporation moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. In reply, the plaintiff asserted that the corpora-
tion's qualification and appointment of a service agent in Texas was tanta-
mount to "consent" to be sued there and obviated any due process inquiry. 16
Overruling this argument, the federal district court held that, "[i]n comply-
10. 978 F.2d at 204.
11. Id. at 205.
12. Id.
13. Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 122 LEd. 356 (1993); see Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer, & Don Colleluori, Texas
Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1055, 1056-57 (1993) [herein-
after Figari, 1993 Annual Survey].
14. 829 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
15. When a foreign corporation has qualified under the Act to transact business in Texas
and has appointed an agent in the state to receive process on its behalf, the relevant statute
provides that "the registered agent so appointed ... shall be agents of such corporation upon
whom any process ... permitted by law to be served upon the corporation may be served."
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10(A) (Vernon 1980).
16. 829 F. Supp. at 886.
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ing with the Texas registration statute, [the nonresident corporation] con-
sented to personal jurisdiction in Texas only if the jurisdiction was
constitutional."' 7 Since the nonresident corporation did not have sufficient
contacts with Texas to satisfy due process, the federal district court ruled
that personal jurisdiction was lacking.' 8
A relatively obscure provision 19 of the Texas long-arm statute continued
to receive attention during the Survey period. A provision of that statute
stipulates that when process is delivered to the Secretary of State for for-
warding to a nonresident defendant, the Secretary of State "shall require a
statement of the name and address of the nonresident's home or home of-
fice" to facilitate such forwarding. 20 Whiskeman v. Lama 21 recently consid-
ered this address requirement as it related to a individual defendant. The
record before the court revealed that the Secretary of State received only an
address for the defendant in Arizona and that he forwarded process to that
location. The plaintiff obtained a default judgment based on this service, and
the defendant sought to set it aside, arguing noncompliance with the statu-
tory provision. Observing that nothing in the record showed that the Ari-
zona address furnished the Secretary of State was the "home office" address
required by the statute, the court concluded the statute had not been satisfied
and set aside the judgment. 22
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
An earlier decision 23 of the supreme court reiterated that a nonresident
defendant has the burden of proof at a special appearance hearing 24 and,
17. Id. at 888-89; but see Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir.
1981) (stating that "[bly virtue of the theory of consent to jurisdiction implicit in TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10, a foreign corporation consents to amenability to jurisdiction for
purposes of all lawsuits brought within the state, whether or not the cause of action relates to
activities within the state."); Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (stating that "in return for the privilege of doing
business in this state, and enjoying the same rights and privileges as a domestic corporation,
the foreign corporation has consented to amenability to jurisdiction for purposes of all lawsuits
within the state").
18. 829 F. Supp. at 891; accord Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 122 L.Ed. 356 (1993).
19. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
20. Id.
21. 847 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
22. Id. at 329-30; see Boreham v. Hartsell, 826 S.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992, no writ) (holding service ineffective in absence of forwarding to defendant's home or
home office); Bank of America v. Love, 770 S.W.2d 890, 891-92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, writ denied) (holding default judgment void due to lack of strict compliance with statu-
tory requirements); Carjan Corp. v. Sonner, 765 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, no writ) (holding service ineffective in absence of forwarding to defendant's home office);
Verges v. Lomas Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ)
(holding strict compliance with address requirement statute); Southern Distrib. Co. v. Techni-
cal Support Assoc., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 1, 2 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that the designated agent's
address insufficient to satisfy compliance requirement).
23. Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1987), cert. denied, 98
L.Ed. 986 (1988). See Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Thomas A. Graves, & A. Erin Dwyer, Texas Civil
Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 523, 528-29 (1988).
24. 734 S.W.2d at 664; see, e.g., Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434,
1680 [Vol. 47
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moreover, that such burden obliges the nonresident to adduce proof negating
all bases of personal jurisdiction. 25 Thus, in order to prevail at a special
appearance hearing, a nonresident defendant must present evidence negating
both a "specific" basis26 and a "general" basis27 for personal jurisdiction.2
Temperature Systems, Inc. v. Bill Pepper, Inc. 29 illustrates some of the pit-
falls presented by this procedure. In its petition, the plaintiff relied only on
specific jurisdiction, alleging a contract connected with Texas as the underly-
ing basis. After the nonresident defendant was served by substituted service,
it filed a special appearance attacking service and a hearing was held by the
trial court on the matter. At the hearing, in addition to establishing facts
supporting the specific basis for jurisdiction, the plaintiff adduced evidence
showing a basis for general jurisdiction. The defendant apparently failed to
object to this evidence, and thereby tried the issue of general jurisdiction by
consent. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court overruled the de-
fendant's special appearance but did not recite the basis for its decision.
Subsequently, the defendant perfected an appeal and sought to overturn the
trial court's ruling. On appeal, the court of appeals found that a specific
basis for jurisdiction was lacking.30 Since the trial court did not state a basis
for its ruling, however, the court of appeals examined the record to ascertain
if the ruling could be upheld on any other basis supported by the evidence. 31
Concluding that the evidence adduced at the special appearance hearing
supported general jurisdiction and that the defendant had failed to shoulder
its burden by negating this basis, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
438 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the defendant must negate all bases of personal jurisdiction);
Hoppenfield v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding that the burden of proof and persuasion rests upon the nonresident defendant); Tay-
lor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1972, no writ) (holding that the nonresident defendant bears burden of pleading and proving
lack of jurisdiction). But see Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S. A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138
(5th Cir. 1980) (stating that if defendant challenges jurisdiction, plaintiff has burden of proof),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490
(5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the party invoking personal jurisdiction has burden of proof);
Jetco Elec. Indus. Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie showing that the long-arm statute is satisfied).
25. Zac Smith & Co., 734 S.W.2d at 664.
26. "Specific" personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action relates to the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum and those contacts were occasioned by the defendant's pur-
poseful conduct. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980) (stating that the defendant must have clear notice that its acts may support personal
jurisdiction); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the defendant is subject to person jurisdiction if it invokes benefits and protection of forum
state's laws). Plaintiff cannot, by his conduct alone, establish the requisite minimum contacts.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 298.
27. "General" personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action does not relate to the
defendant's purposeful conduct within the forum, but the defendant's contacts with the forum
are continuous and systematic. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414-17 (1984) (stating that general personal jurisdiction requires contacts of
continuous and systematic nature); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d at 374 (holding
that due process demands continuous and systematic contacts for general jurisdiction).
28. Zac Smith & Co., 734 S.W.2d at 664.
29. 854 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism'd by agreement) (2-1 decision).
30. 854 S.W.2d at 675.




Hotel Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick 33 is a warning that plaintiff's coun-
sel should allege specific facts supporting personal jurisdiction. The plain-
tiff's petition in Hotel Partners, while acknowledging the defendant was a
nonresident, contained no allegations that the defendant had committed any
acts in Texas.34 After being served with the petition under the long-arm
statute, the defendant filed a special appearance challenging service. Follow-
ing a hearing on the matter, the trial court sustained the special appearance.
On appeal the plaintiff sought reversal, arguing that the defendant's evidence
at the hearing only showed it was a nonresident and failed to negate a spe-
cific or general basis for personal jurisdiction. Agreeing that as a general
rule a defendant bears the burden of negating all bases for personal jurisdic-
tion, the court of appeals observed that the burden is narrowed when a plain-
tiff fails to support personal jurisdiction with specific allegations in his
petition.35 In this regard, the court of appeals held that "[w]ithout jurisdic-
tional allegations by the plaintiff that the defendant has committed any act
in Texas, the defendant can meet its burden of negating all potential bases of
jurisdiction by presenting evidence that it is a nonresident."'36 As a result,
the trial court's order sustaining the special appearance was affirmed.37
Two recent cases,38 adding to an existing conflict, 39 addressed the availa-
bility of mandamus review of a ruling on a special appearance. Rejecting the
availability of such review, both courts concluded that mandamus was un-
available in that instance and that appeal was an adequate remedy at law.40
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The most significant development in the area of service of process was the
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in State Farm and Casualty Co. v.
Costley.41 After ten attempts at personal service, the plaintiff obtained an
order from the trial court under rule 10642 allowing substituted service. The
32. Id. at 676.
33. 847 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
34. Id. at 634.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 634; accord Temperature Systems, Inc. v. Bill Pepper, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 669, 673
(Tex. App.-Dallas, writ dism'd by agreement) (stating that "[a] defendant must negate all
bases of jurisdiction even if there are no jurisdictional allegations in a plaintiff's petition" but
"(i]n such a case, proof that a defendant is a nonresident is sufficient to meet this burden").
37. 847 S.W.2d at 635.
38. Aktienggesellschaft v. Kirk, 859 S.W.2d. 651 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, orig. pro-
ceeding); National Indust. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 855 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
orig. proceeding).
39. Compare N. H. Helicopters, Inc. v. Brown, 841 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992, orig. proceeding) with Laykin v. McFall, 830 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1992, orig. proceeding) (2-I decision). See 1993 Annual Survey at 1060-61.
40. 859 S.W.2d at 653; 855 S.W.2d at 791.
41. NO. D-3488, 1993 WL 218646 (Tex., June 23, 1993).
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(b). In addition to specifying certain methods of service upon a
defendant, the residual section of rule 106 provides that "the court may authorize service ...




order authorized substituted service on the defendant by mailing a copy of
process certified mail, return receipt requested, to the defendant's mailing
address, with an additional copy sent by first-class mail. After substituted
service had been effected, a return was filed showing compliance with the
trial court's order. Subsequently, on the basis of this service, the plaintiff
obtained a default judgment against the defendant. Since no return receipt
bearing the defendant's signature was received, however, the court of appeals
reversed the default judgment. In this regard, the court of appeals held that
service by first-class mail did not satisfy the requirement of rule 106 that
substituted service "be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice"
since there was no showing of actual notice.43 Reversing, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court properly authorized service by first-class mail
and that "to require proof of actual notice upon substituted service would
frustrate Rule 106(b)'s purpose of providing alternative methods" of
service. 44
Article 29c, which was apparently intended to provide flexibility when the
United States mails are used to forward service to a defendant, provides that
"all public officials are hereby authorized and empowered to use certified
mail with return receipt requested, in lieu of registered mail in all instances
where registered mail has heretofore been required or may hereafter be au-
thorized by law."'45 Royal Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Samaria Baptist
Church, 46 a recent decision of the supreme court, authoritatively ruled that
article 29c means what it says. The plaintiff sought to personally serve a
non-profit corporation but was unable to locate the defendant's registered
agent. In this instance, the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act authorizes
service on the Secretary of State of Texas and directs that office to forward
process to the defendant's registered agent by registered mail. 47 Instead, the
Secretary of State forwarded a copy of the process by certified mail.
Although the mailing was returned "unclaimed," the trial court entered a
default judgment against the defendant on the basis of this service. The
court of appeals reversed the default judgment, holding that the use of certi-
fied mail was not in strict compliance with the Act. 48 Disagreeing, the
supreme court concluded that article 29c authorized the use of certified mail
in this instance in place of registered mail. 49
Royal Surplus Lines also considered the impact of a typographical error
made by the Secretary of State in the course of forwarding process. The
43. See Costley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 844 S.W.2d 939, 941-42 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo), rev'd, No. D-3488, 1993 WL 218646 (Tex., June 23, 1993).
44. 1993 WL 218646 at *1.
45. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 29c (Vernon 1969) (emphasis added).
46. 840 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1992).
47. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.07(B) (Vernon 1980).
48. Samaria Baptist Church v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 832 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth), rev'd, 840 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1992).
49. 840 S.W.2d at 382-83; see Harold-Elliott Co., Inc. v. K.P./Miller Realty Growth
Fund I, 853 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist] 1993, no writ) (approving use of
certified mail when TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11(B) required forwarding of process by
Secretary of State by registered mail.)
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certificate of compliance by the Secretary of State reflected that process was
sent to the defendant's registered agent at "1201 Bassie" while the official
records of that office showed that the address of the agent was "1201 Bes-
sie." 50 Although the forwarding envelope and receipt card had been cor-
rected with "Bassie" being marked out and "Bessie" being written in, the
supreme court held that the error was sufficient to require that the default
judgment be set aside. 5'
IV. PLEADINGS
Rule 13,52 which is aimed at deterring the filing of frivolous pleadings,53
was the subject of judicial scrutiny during the Survey period. Rule 13 pro-
vides that the signatures of attorneys or parties on a court filing certify that
they have read it and that the filing "is not groundless and brought in bad
faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment." '54
" 'Groundless', for purposes of the rule, means no basis in law or fact and
not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law." 55 If a party or attorney signs a filing in violation of
the rule, "the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
sanctions ... upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both."'56
GTE Communications Systems Corp. v. Tanner,57 a recent decision of the
Texas Supreme Court, considered this "groundless" requirement in a sum-
mary judgment context.
The plaintiffs asserted product liability claims against the defendant but
the defendant denied any participation in the manufacture of the product in
question. This denial was the central focus of defendant's amended answers,
motion for summary judgment, and two supporting affidavits. After a hear-
ing, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, primarily be-
cause a fact question existed regarding whether the defendant participated in
50. 840 S.W.2d at 383.
51. Id.
52. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
53. See generally Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices (Including the Friv-
olous Suit Question), 1987 St. Mary's Ninth Annual Procedural Institute: Civil Procedure
1988 Rules and Statutory Changes F-2 to -12 (discussing legislative history, purpose, and effect
of rule 13); Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated by the 1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOc. 22,
23 (1987) (discussing frivolous suit deterrence purpose of Rule 13).
54. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. II (analogous federal rule regarding
signing of pleadings). See generally 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur B. Miller, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1331-1335 (1969 & Supp. 1986) (discussing federal rule analogous
to TEX. R. Civ. P. 13).
55. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Two filings are, however, exempt from the scope of the amended
Rule 13. Specifically, the rule provides that neither a general denial nor the amount requested
for damages in a pleading constitute a violation. Id.
56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. The trial court may impose sanctions against the offending party
which include disallowance of further discovery, assessment of discovery expenses or taxable
costs, establishment of designated facts, refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose claims or defenses, striking pleadings, dismissal of claims, rendition of a default judg-
ment, and contempt. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) (miscellaneous sanctions); TEX. R. Civ. P.
215(2)(b)(8) (contempt).
57. 856 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1993).
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the manufacture of the product. Subsequently, on the request of the plain-
tiffs, the trial court granted rule 13 sanctions against the defendant for filing
the amended pleadings, motion, and supporting affidavits, all of which con-
tained the denial. Since the sanctions awarded provided that the defendant's
pleadings be stricken and was therefore determinative of the case, the de-
fendant sought immediate review by mandamus.
Reiterating that Rule 13 only applied to papers signed by counsel, the
supreme court concluded that sanctions based on the filing of the affidavits
were unsupportable since they were not signed by counsel.58 Further, as
regards the trial court's conclusion that the denial in the amended pleadings
and motion were sanctionable, the supreme court observed that those sanc-
tions could not be sustained unless those papers were "groundless" as de-
fined by the rule. 59 Directing its attention to the motion, the supreme court
concluded that:
[A] motion for summary judgment asserting that no genuine issue of
material fact exists is not proved groundless or in bad faith merely by
the filing of a response which raises an issue of fact, even if the response
was or could have been anticipated by the movant. Nor is denial of a
motion for summary judgment alone grounds for sanctions. Rule 13
does not permit sanctions for every pleading or motion that requests relief
which is denied.6°
In conclusion, the supreme court opined that mandamus review was war-
ranted in that instance, inasmuch as the sanctions entered by the trial court
were "case determinative" or "death penalty" sanctions. 6'
Notably, under Rule 13 a trial court may not impose sanctions except for
good cause and, if imposed, the court must set forth the particulars of the
good cause in its sanctions order.62 Giving this language full effect, an ear-
lier case63 overturned a sanctions order which failed to state the particulars
of good cause warranting the imposition of sanctions. Refining this rule,
Booth v. Malkan 6 warns that, unless the lack of specificity in the sanctions
order is called to the attention of the trial court in a timely fashion, the
matter is waived and will not be considered on appeal.
Severance of claims was the subject of judicial attention during the Survey
period. Rule 41 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which establishes the
procedure governing the severance of claims, empowers a trial court to sever
a claim from a case "at any stage of the action, before the time of submission
to the jury or to the court if trial is without a jury, on such terms as are
58. 856 S.W.2d at 730.
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 856 S.W.2d at 732; see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 845 n.2 (Tex.
1992); TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 920 (Tex. 1991).
62. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
63. GTE Communication Sys. Corp. v. Curry, 819 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991) (original proceeding); contra Powers v. Palacios, 771 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (holding that the failure of trial court to recite facts
in its order constituting good cause was not fatal to a levy of sanctions and was harmless
error).
64. 858 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
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just.' '65 Adhering strictly to this requirement, State Department of Highways
and Public Transportation v. Cotner,66 a recent decision of the Texas
Supreme Court, authoritatively held that Rule 41 does not permit a trial
court to sever a claim after it has been submitted to the trier of fact. 67
The principle has long been that, despite the breath of Rule 41, an order
which severs a compulsory counterclaim from the primary suit is not author-
ized by the rule and constitutes an abuse of discretion. 68 Granting that the
principle may vary depending on the type of counterclaim involved, the
court in Goins v. League Bank and Trust 69 concluded that, despite the prin-
ciple applicable to a compulsory counterclaim, Rule 41 authorizes a permis-
sive counterclaim to be severed from the primary suit.
Finally, Richard and Associates v. Millard 70 is an indication that the array
of claims asserted in a case may be such that a severance is mandated. The
plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for the negligent operation of an
automobile and against the defendant's insurance adjuster for bad faith set-
tlement practices. After the trial court refused to grant a severance of the
claims against the adjuster from the balance of the case, the adjuster sought
mandamus review of such refusal. Under the plaintiff's formulation of the
claims in the suit, the adjuster argued that he would be prejudiced if the two
claims were tried together. Finding that the circumstances left the trial
court with no discretion in the matter, the court of appeals directed that a
severance be granted because a joint trial of the claims would necessarily
involve extensive evidence of insurance and unduly prejudice the defense. 71
V. PARTIES
Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which au-
thorizes the taking of interlocutory appeals in limited instances, allows a
party to appeal from an interlocutory order that "certifies or refuses to cer-
tify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure."' 72 Prompting an interpretation of section 51.014, the court in Price
Mortuary Colleges, Inc. v. Bjerke73 was faced with an attempted interlocu-
tory appeal from a trial court's amendment of its earlier order certifying a
class action. Acknowledging that the amendment increased the size of the
class, the court nevertheless found that Section 51.014 authorized an inter-
locutory appeal only with respect to the original order certifying the class
65. TEX. R. Civ. P. 41.
66. 845 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam).
67. 845 S.W.2d at 819; accord Coalition of Cities for Affordable Utility Rates v. Public
Utility Comm'n, 798 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1990).
68. See, e.g., Ryland Group, Inc. v. White, 723 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (original proceeding); Nueces County Hospital Dist. v. Texas Health
Facilities Comm'n, 576 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
69. 857 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
70. 856 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1993, no writ).
71. Id. at 767.
72. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
73. 841 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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and not an amendment of it.74 For this reason, the court dismissed the inter-
locutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 75
A case which may be of interest to the trust practitioner is Wohler v.
LaBuena Vida In Western Hills, Inc. 76 In a suit against a trustee to foreclose
a lien on certain of the trust's real property, the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment after service was effected on the trustee. In attempting to overturn
the default judgment, the trustee argued on appeal that the beneficiaries of
the trust were necessary parties to the suit but were not served or given
notice. Rejecting the trustee's argument, the court of appeals reiterated that
beneficiaries of a trust are not necessary parties to a suit against the trustee
unless the trustee has an adverse interest to the beneficiaries. 77 Finding no
adverse interest apparent from the record, the court of appeals affirmed the
default judgment. 78
VI. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The presumption at common law is well established that all court records
are open to the public.79 Hence, when a party sought to have court records
sealed, that party had to satisfy certain procedural and substantive require-
ments in order to overcome this presumption of openness . 0 These require-
ments, being a matter of common law, were not always readily discernable.8'
The legislature, apparently attempting to define such requirements, enacted
a statute8 2 directing the Texas Supreme Court to establish procedures for the
sealing of court records. Responding to this mandate, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted Rule 76a,83 which became effective September 1, 1990 and
governs the sealing of court records.84
Under the practice at common law, before any sealing could take place, a
party seeking to seal court records had to afford the public both reasonable
74. Id. at 880.
75. Id. at 881.
76. 855 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
77. 855 S.W.2d at 893; accord Mason v. Mason, 366 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. 1963).
78. 855 S.W.2d at 893-94.
79. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
80. See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (1 th Cir. 1983) (finding that "proper
notice" to the public is required); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th
Cir. 1983) (stating that the public must be allowed a "reasonable opportunity to present their
claims").
81. See Lloyd Doggett, Rule 76a-Sealing Court Records, 9 ADVOC. 143 (June 1990)
[hereinafter Doggett].
82. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The statute provides
that "[tihe supreme court shall adopt rules establishing guidelines for the courts of this state to
use in determining whether in the interest of justice the records in a civil case, including settle-
ments, should be sealed." Id.; see also Elaine A. Carlson, Procedure Update: 1990 Amend-
ments to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Procedure, 9 ADVOC. 223, 226 (Oct.
1990) [hereinafter Carlson].
83, TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a; see generally Doggett, supra note 72, at 143-48; Carlson, supra
note 73, at 226-27.
84. The Texas Supreme Court adopted Rule 76a over the dissent of two justices who
described the rule as the most controversial of any in the history of the court. See Changes to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence, 53 TEX. B.J. 589, 590 (1990).
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notice of and an opportunity to be heard in the matter.8 5 Codifying the
notice requirement, Rule 76a requires the movant to post a public notice at
the "site where notices for meetings of county governmental bodies are to be
post;" such notice must set forth the date and place of the proposed hearing
and the particulars of the case as listed in the rule.
86
Rule 76a mandates that court records may be sealed only upon a showing
that a specified, serious and substantial interest clearly outweighs both this
presumption of openness and any probable adverse effect that sealing will
have upon general public health or safety. Further, the movant must
demonstrate that no less restrictive means than sealing records will ade-
quately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted.8 7 Hence, in or-
der to overcome the presumption of openness, a movant under the rule must
establish the possession of a "specified, serious, and substantial interest"
which clearly outweighs such presumption and that less restrictive means
will not protect the specific interest involved. 88
The case of Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co. 89 made its second appellate
appearance due to Rule 76a 9° , focusing on the rule's requirements. Reading
Rule 76a strictly, the court in Chandler reiterated that the requirements 9' of
the rule are mandatory and a failure to satisfy them invalidates the sealing
order.92 Chandler is also significant in its holding that an appeal from a
Rule 76a order is not mooted by an intervening trial of the case, primarily
because the public's interest inherent in disclosure of court records cannot be
mooted or settled by the actions of the party litigants.
93
85. Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983).
86. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(3); see Carlson, supra note 73, at 227; Doggett, supra note 72, at
145.
87. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(l); see Carlson, supra note 73, at 227; Doggett, supra note 72, at
144.
88. The standard that must be met in order to overcome the presumption of openness has
been described at common law using various terms. Regardless of the verbiage used, however,
the standard appears to be stringent. See, e.g., Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d
1568, 1571 (11 th Cir. 1985) (stating that it must be shown that the denial to access is necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest) (citing Globe Newspaper Corp. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982)); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476
(6th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[o]nly the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of
judicial records"); In re National Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating
that "[o]nly the most compelling circumstances should prevent ... public access"). The strin-
gent standard may not be satisfied by an agreement among the litigants. Wilson, 759 F.2d at
1571 n.4 (holding that an agreement of the parties, following the filing of suit, to seal the court
record does not outweigh the presumption of openness so as to justify sealing).
89. 844 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
90. In its first appellate appearance, the Texas Supreme Court held that the definition of
"court records" in Rule 76a encompasses "filed discovery" in a suit, as well as discovery not
filed of record, provided it concerns matters that have "a probable adverse effect upon the
general public's health and safety." Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co., 829 S.W.2d 774, 775
(Tex. 1992); see Figari, 1993 Annual Survey, supra note 9, at 1066.
91. The requirements of Rule 76a specifically mentioned by the court were (1) notice, (2)
sustaining the burden and standard of proof, and (3) a statement by the trial court of the
specific reasons for the entry of the sealing order. See Chandler, 844 S.W.2d at 884.
92. 844 S.W.2d at 884.




The application of Rule 76a to documents obtained in discovery was the
subject of considerable controversy during the survey period. Rule 76a
states that "court records" are "presumed to be open to the public,"' 94 di-
recting that such records are to be open for public examination. Hence,
when documents perceived to be confidential or proprietary are produced by
a litigant during discovery, the litigant usually moves to have their confiden-
tiality protected and the trial court is obliged to determine whether the docu-
ments qualify as "court records," subject to the openness requirement and
calling into play the sealing procedure prescribed in the rule.
Rule 76a defines "court records" to include discovery which has not been
filed of record only when the information concerns "matters that have a
probable adverse effect upon the general public health and safety." 95 While
the scope of the rule in this respect appears straightforward, the procedural
burdens inherent in the "court records" determination have proved trouble-
some.96 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Biffle,97 a recent decision of the Dallas Court of
Appeals, is a virtual guidebook to the procedure to be followed in this area.
The plaintiffs sought document discovery from the defendants in a product
liability suit, and the defendants countered by seeking to limit disclosure of
the unfiled documents because they contained proprietary information. In
setting a procedural course, the trial court presumed that the discovery doc-
uments were open to the public without regard to their effect upon "general
public health and safety." The defendants objected, asserting that the trial
court was obliged to first determine whether the documents were "court
records" and therefore subject to the presumption.98 Overruling this conten-
tion, the trial court proceeded to convene a hearing in the matter and, at
such hearing, allocated the burden of proof to the defendants. 99 After con-
cluding that the defendants had failed to shoulder the burden, the trial court
denied the defendants a sealing order and an appeal ensued.
Reversing the ruling of the trial court, the court of appeals admonished
that "Rule 76a does not contain a presumption that discovery documents
not filed with the trial court are court records. ' 1°° The court emphasized
that, "discovery not filed with the trial court is open to the public only if it is
a court record as defined by the rule" and "[a] trial court may not presume a
particular... group of documents are court records if a party in a Rule 76a
motion raises the issue of whether the discovery in question constitutes court
records." 10' 1 With respect to the burdens applicable at a Rule 76a hearing
involving discovery documents and how they should be allocated, the court
stated that:
94. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(l).
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(c). See Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co., 829 S.W.2d 774, 775
(Tex. 1992); see generally Figari, 1993 Annual Survey, supra note 9, at 1065.
96. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, 846 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, no writ).
97. No. 05-92-00987-CV, 1993 WL 318936 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.).
98. Id.
99. Id.




If the character of the discovery documents that are the subject of the
motion to seal is disputed, we hold it is the burden of the party asserting
that the documents are open to the public to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the documents are court records as defined by Rule
76a. 10 2
Observing that the burden may shift depending on the outcome of this initial
determination, the court held that:
If that burden of proof is met and the trial court finds the documents
are court records, the documents then are presumed to be open to the
general public. At that point, the party moving for the sealing order
has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
court records, though presumed to be open to the general public, should
be sealed nonetheless for the reasons set forth in Rule 76a(l). 10 3
Concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion by initially placing
the burden of proof on the defendants at the Rule 76a hearing, the court of
appeals remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.' 0 4
VII. DISQUALIFICATION OR RECUSAL OF JUDGES
The use of retired or visiting judges continued to generate new case law
during the Survey period. Prior to its recent amendment, section 74.053 of
the Texas Government Code' 0 5 allowed each party only one objection to an
"assigned" judge. In 1991 the legislature added a provision which permits
either party to object to the assignment of a "former" judge who is not quali-
fied as a "retired" judge.'0 6 The court in Garcia v. Employers Insurance of
Wausau 107 held that this amendment affords each party an unlimited
number of objections to "former" judges.' 0 8 Thus, the appellant in the case
was still entitled to object to the "retired" judge that was assigned to hear
the case after appellant had already used an objection to knock out the "for-
mer" judge previously assigned to the case. '0 9 Although the defendants in
Rubin v. Hoffman 110 knew for several weeks that a visiting judge had been
assigned to hear the case, they did not object to the assignment until one
hour before a temporary injunction hearing was scheduled to begin in front
of the visiting judge. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that defendants
102. 1993 WL 318936, at *2; accord Ford Motor Co. v. Benson, 846 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
103. 1993 WL 318936, at *2. In an earlier decision, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected
"clear and convincing evidence" as the standard of proof allocated to a movant in a rule 76a
hearing in favor of a "preponderance of the evidence." See Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, No. 05-
92-00777-CV, 1992 WL 351191, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 24, 1992, no writ).
104. 1993 WL 318936, at *3.
105. Acts of 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 505, § 1, 1987 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2118 (now codified at
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN, § 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993)).
106. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(d) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
107. 856 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
108. Id. at 508.
109. Id.
110. 843 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
1690 (Vol. 47
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
had timely objected to the assignment under section 74.053. 1 While both
the plaintiffs and the trial court accused defendants of bad faith or harass-
ment in springing their objection at the last minute, the court of appeals
could find no exception to the mandatory language of the statute on either of
those two bases.' 12 Finally, in a case of first impression, the court in Lone
Star Industries, Inc. v. Ater 113 decided that a retired judicial officer may not
act as an assigned judge until he makes the formal election required under
section 75.001114 to qualify for service.1 15 Although the retired judge in Ater
unquestionably met the eligibility requirements to serve as an assigned
judge, 116 and he filed his written election with the supreme court within
ninety days of his retirement, he had already begun to serve on an assigned
case before filing his formal election. Consequently, all actions the retired
judge took before the date of his election were null and void. 117
Rule 18a, which governs the disqualification of judges for cause, provides
that a party may file a motion to disqualify at least ten days before the date
set for trial. 1 8 Before proceedings in the case can continue, the judge to
whom the motion is directed must either recuse himself or refer the motion
to the presiding judge of the district for determination.' 19 If the judge de-
clines to recuse himself voluntarily, he may enter no orders in the case be-
tween the date the motion to disqualify is filed and the date it is decided,
except for good cause shown in the order itself. 120 Given the latter stricture
of the rule, the court in Mixon v. Moye 121 set aside as void temporary cus-
tody orders the trial court entered after one party sought to disqualify him.
In doing so, the court of appeals observed that the trial judge had already
recused himself in response to the motion before he entered the temporary
orders. 122 The appellate court also pointed out that the trial court's order
did not fit within the rule's exception because it failed to state any facts
constituting good cause. 123 According to Winfield v. Doggett,124 a motion to
disqualify can still be timely even if it is filed after the case has already been
I 11. Id. at 659; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (stating that
an objection must be filed before the first hearing or trial over which the assigned judge
presides).
112. 843 S.W.2d at 659.
113. 845 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ). The court's opinion is dupli-
cated in a companion case decided the same day. See Houston General Ins. Co. v. Ater, 843
S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
114. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 75.001 (Vernon Supp. 1993). A retiree may make the
election by delivering a document to the chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court within 90
days of retirement, in which case the election is effective immediately. Id. § 75.001(b)(1).
Otherwise, the retiree must petition the supreme court, and the election is not effective unless
and until the supreme court approves the petition. Id. §§ 75.001(b)(2) & 75.001(c).
115. Ater, 845 S.W.2d at 337.
116. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.055(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
117. 845 S.W.2d at 337.
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a).
119. Id. 18a(c), 18a(d).
120. Id. 18a(d).
121. 860 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
122. Id. at 210.
123. Id.
124. 846 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
1994] 1691
SMU LAW REVIEW
tried. Whenever an appellate court reverses a judgment and remands a case
for new trial, the case stands upon the docket as if it had not been tried. 125
If a motion to recuse is then filed more than ten days before the case is set for
retrial or other hearing, the motion is timely under Rule 18a(a). 1 26
VIII. VENUE
Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc. 127 involved venue issues arising from a plaintiff's
third suit against the same defendant. Plaintiff's original suit, filed in Harris
County, was dismissed as a sanction for discovery abuse. Plaintiff filed a
second suit in Zapata County shortly before the dismissal of the first suit.
Although the defendant filed a motion to transfer venue of this suit to Harris
County, the trial court dismissed the second suit for non-prosecution before
ruling on the motion to transfer. When the plaintiff's representative subse-
quently filed a third lawsuit in yet another county, the defendant again re-
sponded by filing a motion to transfer venue, which was denied by the trial
court.
On appeal, the defendant argued that venue of the third suit was fixed in
Harris County by virtue of the dismissal of plaintiff's second suit while the
motion to transfer was still pending. As the defendant correctly pointed out,
numerous decisions under the pre-existing venue statute and rules had held
that venue was fixed in the county named in a plea of privilege 128 whenever a
plaintiff nonsuited his action before the trial court made its venue determina-
tion. 129 Although the court of appeals acknowledged in dictum that this
"venue fixing" rule survived the 1983 venue amendments,' 30 it held that the
rule did not apply to Ruiz because his earlier suit was dismissed involunta-
rily by order of the trial court.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the court concluded that
defendant's motion to transfer venue should have been granted because
plaintiff failed to make prima facie proof that the defendant, a foreign corpo-
125. Id. at 922.
126. Id.
127. No. D-1903, 1993 WL 382062 (Tex. Sept. 29, 1993).
128. Prior to their amendment in 1983, the rules of procedure governing venue hearings
provided for the filing of a "plea of privilege" as the procedural mechanism for challenging a
plaintiff's choice of venue. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 120a, 385, 527 (1983).
Complementing the legislature's 1983 overhaul of the Texas venue statute, Act of June 17,
1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 385 § 1, 1983 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2119, 2119-24 [now codified at TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.001-.100 (Vernon 1986)], the Texas Supreme Court
promulgated amended procedural rules in 1983 that eliminated all references to the plea of
privilege. See Order of June 15, 1983, reprinted in 46 TEX. B.J. 858-59 (1983) (special tear-out
section).
129. See, e.g., Royal Petroleum Corp. v. McCallum, 134 Tex. 543, 135 S.W.2d 958, 967
(1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 601 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
130. Conoco, Inc. v. Ruiz, 818 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), affd, No.
D-1903, 1993 WL 382062, at *6; see also Hendrick Medical Ctr. v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ), discussed in Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer & Don
Colleluori, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 SMU L. REV. 491, 501-02
(1986).
131. 818 S.W.2d at 123. According to the court of appeals, neither a dismissal for lack of
prosecution nor a dismissal for discovery abuse is voluntary. Id.
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ration, had an agency or representative in the county of suit. 132 The court of
appeals therefore reversed the venue determination and remanded to the
trial court with an order that the case be transferred to Harris County.1 33
In the supreme court, the defendant again argued that venue was fixed in
Harris County due to the dismissal of plaintiff's earlier suit while a motion to
transfer venue was pending. The supreme court disagreed, observing that
the so-called "res judicata" rule of venue applied under the old statute only
because a plaintiff who dismissed his suit implicitly admitted that the plea of
privilege had merit. 134 Concluding that a plaintiff whose action is involunta-
rily dismissed does not concede the merits of any pending motions, the
Court held that a dismissal for want of prosecution while a motion to trans-
fer venue is pending does not fix venue in the county named in the motion to
transfer venue. 135 Unlike the court of appeals, however, the supreme court
included no dictum in its opinion regarding-the continued vitality of the "res
judicata" rule.' 3 6 The Court stated that it need not decide whether the rule
still exists under the current venue statute because plaintiff did not volunta-
rily nonsuit either of his two earlier cases.137
Notwithstanding this ruling, the supreme court agreed with the intermedi-
ate appellate court that there was no basis for venue in Starr County and the
case should have been transferred to Harris County.138 Although plaintiff
alleged that venue was proper in Starr County under section 15.037'39 be-
cause the defendant employed a production foreman there, plaintiff's evi-
dence demonstrated that this purported agent was empowered only to order
pre-approved supplies of minimal value. This was not enough, according to
the Court, and there was no other evidence the production foreman had the
degree of discretion required to establish venue in Starr County.140 In order
to satisfy section 15.037, opined the Court, a plaintiff must establish either
that the business of the defendant is actually conducted in the county of suit
in a more or less regular and permanent form (agency) or that a party pos-
sessing broad power and discretion to act for the defendant resides there
(representative). 141
Of perhaps greater significance is the court's discussion in Ruiz of the
standard for appellate review of venue determinations. Under rule 87, a trial
court deciding a motion to transfer venue must accept as true all venue facts
132. Id. at 126 (citing Milligan v. Southern Express, Inc., 151 Tex. 315, 250 S.W.2d 194,
198 (1952)).
133. 818 S.W.2d at 118.




138. Id. at *14-15.
139. Section 15.037 provides that foreign corporations doing business in Texas may be sued
in any county in which the company may have an agency or representative. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 15.037 (Vernon 1986).




established by prima facie proof prior to the venue hearing. 142 Section
15.064 of the venue statute, on the other hand, requires an appellate court to
consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits, in determining
the propriety of venue.1 43 Pursuant to the statute, therefore, an appellate
court must reverse' 44 the venue determination if evidence in the record-
even evidence adduced after the trial court decided the venue question-
destroys the prima facie proof on which the trial court relied. 14 5 The
supreme court questioned the wisdom of this statute, pointing out that it
allows appellate review of the venue decision on a basis different from that
on which it was determined by the trial court.' 46 Nevertheless, the Court
observed that it was constrained by the plain language of the statute which
was unambiguous. 47 Therefore, it held that an appellate court must con-
duct an independent review of the entire evidentiary record in determining
whether venue was proper in the ultimate county of suit.' 48
Apparently to minimize the problems that would otherwise result from
this "fundamental flaw"1 4 9 in the venue statute, the supreme court also held
that an appellate court need not review the evidence regarding venue for
factual sufficiency. 150 According to the Court, section 15.064(b) does not
mandate a review of the record for factual sufficiency and, therefore, such a
level of review is neither necessary nor wise.' 5' Consequently, "if there is
any probative evidence in the entire record, including trial on the merits,
that venue was proper in the county where judgment was rendered, the ap-
pellate court must uphold the trial court's determination."', 52
Although the venue statute mandates reversal on appeal if a case is trans-
ferred to a county of improper venue, the statute is silent about cases in
which a lawsuit is originally brought in a county of proper venue but is
subsequently transferred to another county in which venue is also proper. 53
Some courts interpreting the statute before Ruiz concluded by implication
that a trial court's erroneous venue ruling in these circumstances was harm-
less.' 54 The court in at least one other pre-Ruiz decision disagreed, holding
that a plaintiff's right to prosecute his suit in the county in which he right-
fully brought it is a fundamental right that is not susceptible to a harmless
142. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(a)
(Vernon 1986) (no factual proof concerning the merits shall be required in venue hearings).
143. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
144. Id. ("if venue was improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be revers-
ible error").








153. See supra note 127 and associated text.
154. See, e.g., Lewis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 786 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989,
writ denied); see also Flores v. Arrieta, 790 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied) (dictum), discussed in Ernest E. Figari, A. Erin Dwyer & Don Colleluori, Texas Civil
Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 SMU L. REV. 73, 91-92 (1991).
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error analysis. 55 Unfortunately, the decision in Ruiz may not have an-
swered the question satisfactorily inasmuch as two courts of appeals decided
the issue differently in opinions handed down after Ruiz. 156
In Wilson v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Department157 for example, the
Austin Court of Appeals held that a trial court's erroneous transfer of a case
from a county of proper venue to another county of proper venue does not
constitute reversible error. The court relied heavily on Ruiz in arriving at
this conclusion.158 In particular, the court emphasized Ruiz's holding that a
venue decision will be affirmed if venue was proper in "the ultimate county
of suit."' 159 Although the court acknowledged that Ruiz involved a trial
court's refusal to transfer venue, it concluded that the supreme court's anal-
ysis likewise governed cases in which the trial court ordered a transfer.' 6
According to the court, "the only question to resolve in venue appeals under
section 15.064 is whether venue was proper in the ultimate county of
suit."'61
Although there is much in Wilson to commend, the Beaumont Court of
Appeals took an equally logical but different view in Hendrick v. McMor-
row. 162 The Hendrick court likewise noted that, according to Ruiz, the issue
on appeal is not whether the trial court properly determined venue but
whether venue was improper in the ultimate county of Suit.163 The court
hastened to add, however, that Ruiz did not clarify what was meant by "im-
proper" venue. 64 Apparently concluding that venue any place other than
the county a plaintiff rightfully chooses is always improper, the court re-
versed the trial court's order transferring venue to a county of defendant's
choosing even though venue admittedly would have been proper in that
county if plaintiff had initially filed there. 165 In doing so, the court empha-
sized that the choice of venue lies with the plaintiff under Texas' statutory
155. Marantha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 742 (Tex. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1992, writ denied); discussed in Figari, 1993 Annual Survey, supra note 9,
at 1069-70.
156. Compare Wilson v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept., 853 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, no writ) with Hendrick v. McMorrow, 852 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ). Although Wilson and Hendrick were decided before the
supreme court issued its opinion on rehearing in Ruiz, both cases cited the supreme court's
earlier published opinion in Ruiz. See Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 36 Tex. S. Ct. J. 412 (Dec. 31,
1992), opinion withdrawn and replaced on rehearing by No. D-1903, 1993 WL 382062 (Tex.
Sept. 29, 1993). Moreover, the portion of the earlier Ruiz opinion relied on by the Hendrick
and Wilson courts does not differ markedly from the supreme court's later opinion on
rehearing.
157. 853 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
158. Id. at 829 (citing Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 36 Tex. S. Ct. J. 412, 418 (Dec. 31, 1992)
(opinion withdrawn)).
159. Id.
160. 853 S.W.2d at 829.
161. Id. The court also noted that the Ruiz opinion cited Lewis approvingly, thereby indi-
cating an implicit rejection of the Marantha approach. Id. (citing Ruiz, 36 Tex. S. Ct. J. at
418).
162. 852 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
163. Id. at 24 (citing Ruiz, 36 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 417).
164. 852 S.W.2d at 24. Therefore, according to Hendrick, the decision in Ruiz settled only
the question of what standard of review governed venue appeals. Id.
165. Id. at 25.
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scheme. 166 In order to give the venue statutes their intended effect, there-
fore, a trial court's error in transferring a case from a county of proper venue
selected by the plaintiff cannot be considered harmless. 167
Although Hendrick and Wilson were each decided before the supreme
court issued its opinion on rehearing in Ruiz, the latter opinion contains
language almost identical to the language from the original opinion in Ruiz
that was cited by both courts of appeals. 168 Given these intermediate courts'
differing perceptions about the meaning of that language, the issue will ap-
parently remain unsettled until the supreme court speaks again.
IX. LIMITATIONS
Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 169 which is discussed at length in the preceding sec-
tion of this article dealing with venue, also involved an important issue of
limitations. Ruiz timely filed a suit for personal injury accusing Conoco of
negligence. By the time that suit was dismissed for discovery abuse, Ruiz
had already filed another suit against Conoco. The trial court also dismissed
this second suit for want of prosecution. In the meantime, a court in an
unrelated proceeding determined that Ruiz had been incompetent since the
date of his accident, and appointed Ruiz's wife as his guardian. Ruiz's wife
then brought a third suit against Conoco in her capacity as Ruiz's guardian.
Because the guardian filed this latter suit more than five years after Ruiz's
accident, however, Conoco alleged the suit was barred by limitations. 170
The guardian responded that the two-year statute of limitations had been
tolled due to Ruiz's incompetency. On appeal, Conoco contended that
Texas's tolling provision' 7' was intended to protect only those who did not
have access to the courts during the period of their legal disability. Accord-
ing to Conoco, therefore, the tolling statute did not apply to Ruiz because he
had access to the courts after his accident, as evidenced by his filing of the
two earlier lawsuits.
The supreme court rejected defendant's attempt to equate the tolling pro-
vision for legal disabilities with a lack of access to the courts. 172 In doing so
the court drew an analogy to cases involving minors, in which access to the
courts has never operated to suspend the legal disability. 173 The Court fur-
166. Id. at 24-25.
167. Id. at 24.
168. Compare 1993 WL 382062, at *11-13 with 36 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 417-18.
169. No. D-1903, 1993 WL 382062 (Tex. Sept. 29, 1993).
170. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986) requires a party
suing for personal injury to bring his suit not later than two years after the cause of action
accrued.
171. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) provides, in
pertinent part: "For the purposes of this subchapter, a person is under a legal disability if the
person is ... (2) of unsound mind." If a person is under a legal disability when the cause of
action accrues, the period of the disability is not included in the limitations period. Id.
§ 16.001(b).
172. 1993 WL 382062, at *9.
173. Id. (citing Greathouse v. F.W. & Denver City Ry., 65 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1933, holding approved); Hopkins v. Spring I.S.D., 706 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), afrd, 736 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1987)).
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ther noted that the disability of an incompetent includes his inability to par-
ticipate in, control, or even understand the progression of his suit, assuming
he has access to the courts to file one. 174 Because access alone does not
guarantee that minors or incompetents will have a viable opportunity to pro-
tect their legal rights, the Court decided that the tolling provision is intended
to do more than merely ensure access to the courts.175 For this reason, the
Court held that the mere commencement of a lawsuit on behalf of a legally
incapacitated person does not by itself terminate the protection of the tolling
provision.' 76 Although the Court acknowledged that limitations could be
tolled for the lifetime of a plaintiff under this standard, it concluded that
"this possibility did not dictate a different result.' 77
In DeCheca v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, Inc. 178 the supreme court an-
swered four questions certified to it from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 179 All of these questions involved the interplay be-
tween the notice and limitations provisions of the Texas health care stat-
ute.' 80 Specifically, the court was asked: (1) whether notice of a health care
liability claim to one health care provider operates under section 4.01(c)' 8'
to toll the two-year statute of limitations' 82 for seventy-five days as to all
health care providers against whom a claim is timely asserted; (2) Whether a
claim is barred when notice is served within the extended limitations period,
but plaintiff does not file suit until after the extended limitations deadline in
order to comply with the sixty day pre-suit notice requirement of the stat-
ute;' 83 (3) whether each health care provider sued is entitled to a separate
sixty day pre-suit negotiation period; and (4) whether a claim may be abated
beyond the extended limitations deadline due to a plaintiffs failure to pro-
vide timely pre-suit notice to each defendant named in the suit.' 84 These
questions arose because plaintiffs served pre-suit notice of their health care
claim on only some of the named defendants within two years of the date
their cause of action accrued. Pre-suit notice was served on the remaining
defendants within two years and seventy-five days of accrual, however, and
they were also named in the suit plaintiffs filed by the extended limitations
174. 1993 WL 382062, at *9.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *10. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed what it believed to be the
well-established majority rule. See Jean E. Maess, Annotation, Tolling of State Statute of Lim-
itations in favor of One Commencing Action Despite Existing Disability, 30 A.L.R. 4th 1092,
1093 (1984).
177. 1993 WL 382062, at *10.
178. 852 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1993).
179. DeCheca v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 967 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1992), certified ques-
tion accepted, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 57 (Oct. 17, 1992).
180. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 4.01(a), 4.01(c) & 10.01 (Vernon Supp.
1993).
181. Id. § 4.01(c) (proper notice of health care claim tolls limitations to and including 75
days following the delivery of notice as to all parties and potential parties).
182. Id. § 10.01 (two year statute of limitations on health care claims).
183. Id. § 4.01(a) (person asserting a health care liability claim shall give written notice to
each health care provider against whom claim is being made at least 60 days before filing suit).
184. DeCheca, 852 S.W.2d at 936.
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deadline. As a result, these latter defendants did not receive their pre-suit
notice at least sixty days in advance of suit.
Answering all four of the Fifth Circuit's questions in the affirmative,18 5
the supreme court first determined that the "potential parties" language of
section 4.01(c) means that notice to any of the health care providers tolls the
limitations period for seventy-five days as to all health care providers the
plaintiff ultimately sues.186 The court emphasized, however, that a plaintiff
may never file his suit outside the extended limitations period.18 7 To avert
expiration of the limitations period, therefore, a plaintiff may be required
under exigent circumstances to file his suit before the sixty day pre-suit no-
tice period elapses or even without tendering any notice.' 88 Nevertheless,
each defendant sued is still entitled to a separate sixty day pre-suit period for
negotiations. 8 9 So long as plaintiff sues each defendant within the limita-
tions period, however, abatement is the only remedy for failure to provide
the requisite notice to a particular defendant. 190 Moreover, the court an-
nounced that such an abatement may extend beyond the two year and sev-
enty-five day extended limitations period. 191
Finally, in Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly 192 the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that contract actions brought by assignees of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation are subject to the four year statute of
limitations applicable under Texas law. 193 Plaintiff argued that FIRREA's
six year statute of limitations 194 applied because it was bringing the claim as
an assignee of the FDIC. The court concluded otherwise based on the lan-
guage of the statute, which is limited to the FDIC and does not expressly
cover assignees.' 95 Further, because the statute of limitations governing a
particular cause of action is not a "right" that can be inherited by an as-
signee, the court disagreed with plaintiff's contention that the Texas UCC 19 6
required application of the six year statute.197 The court likewise rejected
plaintiff's policy arguments, stating it would not "rewrite an otherwise clear
and unambiguous statute under the guise of public policy."'1 98 The careful
practitioner should note that the decision in Weatherly splits with several
recent decisions by other courts of appeals' 99 and that the Texas Supreme
185. Id.
186. Id. at 937-38.
187. Id. at 938.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 938-39.
191. Id. at 939.
192. 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ granted).
193. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a) (Vernon 1986) (4 year statute of
limitations for actions on debt).
194. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (six year statute of limitations for contract claims brought
by the FDIC as conservator or receiver).
195. 842 S.W.2d at 776.
196. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(a) (Vernon 1968) provides, in pertinent part,
that "transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as a transferor has therein."
197. 842 S.W.2d at 777.
198. Id. at 778.
199. See Thweatt v. Jackson, 838 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted);
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In Barbero v. Wittig2° ° the supreme court held that, in accordance with
the express terms of Rule 206(2),201 the custodial attorney of a deposition
must make the original deposition available upon request for photocopying
by any other party.20 2 The court noted that the custodial attorney may ap-
ply to the trial court for any orders that may be necessary to protect the
integrity of the original transcript. 20 3
The supreme court has previously held that a party's mere pleading of
mental anguish damages is not sufficient to require that party to submit to
mental examination pursuant to Rule 167a. 204 The court in Spear v.
Gayle20 5 applied this reasoning in holding that a plaintiff cannot require a
defendant to submit to a mental examination merely by pleading that the
defendant's conduct was attributable to a psychological disorder. 20 6 The
court noted that, to rule otherwise, would open the door to compelled
mental examination of defendants in virtually every personal injury suit.20 7
Villages of Greenbriar v. Hutchison 208 involved the question of whether a
witness can be required to obtain a copy of a sworn statement the witness
gave to one party in a lawsuit so that he can produce it to the other party to
the suit.20 9 The court of appeals acknowledged that the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure give a witness the right to obtain a copy of his statement. 2 10 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that those rules did not require the witness to obtain
the statement, and the trial court erred, therefore, in ordering the witness to
do so at the other party's request. 2 1" Interestingly, in reaching its conclu-
sion, the court did not mention Rule 166b(2)(b), 212 which provides that a
person is deemed to have possession, custody, or control of a document if he
has a superior right to compel production of it from a third party. 21 3
Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., No. 13-91-239-CV, 1992 WL 111606 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi May 28, 1992, n.w.h.) (not yet reported).
200. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 532 (Feb. 3, 1993).
201. TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(2).
202. Barbero, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 533.
203. Id.
204. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a; see Coats v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1988).
205. 857 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
206. Id. at 125-26.
207. Id. at 125.
208. 1993 WL 102212 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] Apr. 2, 1993, orig. proceeding).
209. Id. at * 1.
210. Id. at *2-3 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(g) and 166b(3)(c)).
211. Hutchison, 1993 WL 102212 at *3-4.




B. PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court decided a number of cases during the Survey
period involving privileges and exemptions from discovery. At least one of
those decisions, National Tank Co. v. Brotherton,214 can be expected to have
a significant effect on trial practitioners. In Brotherton, the Court concluded
that Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503(a)(2) 215 adopts the so-called "control
group" test in defining who is a representative of a corporate client for pur-
poses of the attorney-client privilege. 21 6 Under this test, only communica-
tions between attorneys and the upper echelon of corporate management are
generally protected by the privilege. 21 7 The Court recognized that the
United States Supreme Court previously rejected the control group test for a
number of reasons in Upjohn Co. v. United States218 but held that Rule
503,219 which was promulgated after the decision in Upjohn, nevertheless
clearly adopted the control group test.220 In order to properly support an
attorney-client privilege objection, therefore, the objecting party must ad-
duce evidence that the representative of a corporate client with whom the
attorney has communicated had the authority to engage counsel or act on
counsel's advice. 22'
The opinion in Brotherton also clarified to some degree the scope of the
attorney work product privilege under Rule 166b(3)(a). 222 Acknowledging
that "work product" is not defined in the rule or its own prior opinions, the
supreme court nevertheless concluded that there was nothing to indicate
that the phrase was intended to have a different meaning than that adopted
by the federal courts. 223 Thus, the Court held that "the term 'work product'
as used in Rule 166b(3)(a) applies only to materials prepared in anticipation
of litigation. '224 The Court left unanswered, however, the question of
214. 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993).
215. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503(a)(2). The rule provides: "A representative of the client is
one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursu-
ant thereto, on behalf of the client." Id.
216. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d at 197.
217. Id. The usual alternative to the control group test is the "subject matter" test, which
cloaks with privilege any communications by a company's employee to its attorney if the em-
ployee is acting at the direction of his superiors, and the subject matter upon which the attor-
ney's advice is sought and dealt with in the communication involves the employee's
performance of his duties. Id. at 198 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afl'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)).
218. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
219. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503.
220. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d at 197-98. The court noted that both the control group and
subject matter tests "are supported by legitimate policy rationales, and neither is without its
critics." Id. at 198 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 199 (holding that, because there was no evidence that the employees interviewed
by corporation's attorney were representatives of corporation within meaning of TEX. R. Civ.
EVID. 503(a)(2), those communications were not protected by attorney-client privilege). The
court implied, without expressly deciding, that an employee of a liability insurer may qualify
as a representative of the insured if he has the authority to hire counsel and act on counsel's
advice on behalf of the insured. Id.
222. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(a).
223. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d at 201-02.
224. Id. at 202.
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whether "work product" in Texas is limited solely to opinion work product,
or whether it includes instead both opinion and ordinary work product. 225
Finally, the Court took the opportunity in Brotherton to modify the two-
prong test enunciated in Flores v. Fourth Court ofAppeals2 2 6 for determining
if an investigation is conducted in anticipation of litigation for purposes of
Rule 166b(3)(c) and 166b(3)(d). 227 Under Flores, trial courts were required
to determine (1) if a reasonable person would have anticipated litigation,
with an emphasis on whether there were outward manifestations that litiga-
tion was "imminent," and (2) if the objecting party in fact had a good faith
belief that litigation would ensue.228 Brotherton removed the "imminence"
requirement from this test on the ground that it impaired the policies behind
the witness statement and party communication privileges. 229 The Court
therefore disapproved of its prior decision in Stringer v. Eleventh Court of
Appeals 230 to the extent it held that the occurrence of an accident alone
could never be sufficient to trigger the privilege. 23 1 Instead, the Court held
that both prongs of the test are met if, upon an evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude, and the party actu-
ally believes in good faith, that there is a "substantial chance" that litigation
will ensue. 232 Moreover, although the Court noted that investigations that
are actually undertaken for some other purpose are not in anticipation of
litigation, even investigations that are routinely undertaken in the ordinary
course of business may be in anticipation of litigation if both prongs of this
test have been met.2 3
3
The supreme court again addressed the work product privilege in National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Valdez.234 The Court held that production of an
attorney's entire litigation file would reveal the attorney's mental processes
with respect to the organization of the file and decision of what to include in
it; thus, a request for such a file is objectionable on work product grounds. 2 35
The Court was careful to point out, however, that a party is not prevented
from requesting specific documents or categories of documents that are rele-
vant, even though those documents may be contained in the attorney's
file.
2 3 6
In Republic Insurance Co. v. Davis237 the supreme court stated for the first
time that the "offensive use" waiver, announced in Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of
225. Id. at 202 n.l 1.
226. 777 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1989).
227. TEX. R. Ov. P. 166b(3)(c); TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d); Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d at
203-07.
228. Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 40-41.
229. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d at 203.
230. 720 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1986).
231. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d at 204.
232. Id. at 204.
233. Id. at 204, 206-07.
234. 863 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1993).
235. Id. at 460.
236. Id.
237. 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1993).
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Appeals,238 is applicable to the attorney-client privilege. 239 The Court held,
however, that an offensive use waiver should not be lightly found and articu-
lated the following factors that should guide the determination:
First, before a waiver may be found the party asserting the privilege
must seek affirmative relief. Second, the privileged information sought
must be such that, if believed by the fact finder, in all probability it
would be outcome determinative of the cause of action asserted. Mere
relevance is insufficient. A contradiction in position is insufficient. The
confidential communication must go to the very heart of the affirmative
relief sought. Third, disclosure of the confidential communication must
be the only means by which the aggrieved party may obtain the evi-
dence. If any one of these requirements is lacking, the trial court must
uphold the privilege. 24°
It is unclear to what extent the Court intended these requirements to apply
outside the context of the attorney-client privilege, especially since certain
privileges created by the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence contain their own
exceptions for cases in which the privileged information is relevant. 241 At
least one court has applied the Republic Insurance Co. factors, however, in
determining whether there was an offensive use waiver of a party's privilege
against self incrimination. 242
Republic Insurance Co. is also significant because it reaffirms that the
party communication privilege of Rule 166b(3)(d) 243 applies only to commu-
nications that occur in connection with the particular action in which the
privilege is asserted. 244 Although the Court apparently recognized the in-
consistency of this holding with the policies underlying its decision in
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell,245 the Court stated that it could
not ignore the express language of the rule. 246
The supreme court addressed waiver of the attorney-client and work prod-
uct privileges by inadvertent disclosure in Granada Corp. v. First Court of
Appeals.247 The Court noted that, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Evi-
dence, a privilege is waived if the information is voluntarily disclosed by the
238. 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1985).
239. Republic Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d at 163.
240. Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted). In the case before it, the supreme court concluded that
the first of these requirements was not met because plaintiffs declaratory judgment action did
not constitute a claim for affirmative relief. Id. at 164. Similarly, in Valdez, 863 S.W.2d 458,
the court held that the defendant insurer's motion for summary judgment, which relied on the
testimony of its former attorney that the denial of a claim was reasonable, did not give rise to
an offensive use waiver because the insurer was not seeking affirmative relief. Id. at 461-62.
241. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 509(d)(4) (creating exception to physician-patient privi-
lege for communications relevant to physical or mental condition that is relied upon by any
party as part of its claim or defense).
242. See Denton v. Texas Dep't of Public Safety Officers Ass'n, 862 S.W.2d 785 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, n.w.h.).
243. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
244. Republic Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d at 165.
245. 818 S.W.2d 749, 750-52 (Tex. 1991) (holding that work product privilege is not lim-
ited to documents prepared in connection with particular case in which discovery is sought).
246. Republic Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d at 165.
247. 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1993).
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holder of the privilege. 248 Thus, the Court held that a party who seeks to
avoid a waiver of privilege with respect to documents that have been dis-
closed must prove, with specificity, that the disclosure was involuntary and
not merely inadvertent. 249 The factors to be considered in determining in-
voluntariness include the precautionary measures taken, the delay in rectify-
ing the error, the extent of any inadvertent disclosure, and the scope of
discovery. 250
The effect of federal regulatory policies on discovery in the Texas courts
was at issue in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Marshall.251 Over a strongly-worded
dissent, 252 the Court concluded that while Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulations regarding the confidentiality of the identity of persons
and institutions reporting adverse reactions to a drug did not preempt Texas
law, those regulations should have been given due consideration by the trial
court before it ordered the defendant drug company to produce copies of
such reports. 253 Specifically, the Court held that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering disclosure of the reporters' identities without a show-
ing of particularized need and relevance. 2 4
Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Caldwell255 involved the issue of whether a
court can order production of a portion of written communications that are
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court in that case had
ordered the objecting party to redact those portions of several documents
that fell within the attorney-client privilege and produce those portions that
contained relevant, factual information. 256 Although the court of appeals
agreed that relevant facts may not be hidden by a claim of privilege, it held
that those facts must be discovered by means other than production of privi-
leged documents containing the information. 257 According to the appellate
court, "[o]nce it is established that a document contains a confidential com-
munication, the privilege extends to the entire document, and not merely the
specific portions relating to legal advice, opinions, or mental analysis. '25
C. SANCTIONS
The Texas appellate courts continued to struggle during the Survey period
with cases in which trial courts imposed "death penalty" sanctions (such as
entering default judgment and striking pleadings) for discovery abuse. In
248. Id. at 226 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 511).
249. Granada Corp., 844 S.W.2d at 226.
250. Id.
251. 850 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. 1993).
252. Id. at 161-64 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 160.
254. Id. The court thereafter granted in part a motion to enforce compliance with its writ
of mandamus, when the trial court, without further evidence or argument, modified its prior
order to require disclosure only of the identity of persons or institutions reporting suicide as an
adverse reaction. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Tex. 1993).
255. 861 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
256. Id. at 424.




Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee,25 9 for example, the supreme court reversed a
trial court's imposition of death penalty sanctions as inconsistent with the
standards enunciated in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,2 6°
where there was nothing in the record approaching the flagrant bad faith or
abuse necessary to support such sanctions.261 Significantly, the high court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that no statement of facts from the
hearing on the motion for sanctions was included in the record on appeal.2 62
The Court relied on the fact that the trial judge's order made no reference to
evidence considered, and apparently none was adduced at the hearing on the
motion.263
Following the supreme court's lead, the courts of appeals now routinely
overturn death penalty sanctions on a variety of grounds. In State Farm
Ins. Co. v. Pults,264 the court held that striking defendant's pleadings and
witnesses as a sanction for violating a prior discovery order could not be
upheld where the prior order was not in writing and had not been "ren-
dered" in open court, although the parties had been notified telephonically
of the trial court's ruling. 265 In Westfall Family Farms v. King Ranch 266 the
court held that an order compelling discovery is not an order imposing lesser
sanctions; thus, the trial court should not have struck the offending party's
pleading for failing to comply with a prior order compelling discovery with-
out first considering and imposing lesser sanctions. 267 Shook v. Gilmore &
Tatge Manufacturing Co. 268 involved what the dissent called "the only case
in American jurisprudence in which a court has sanctioned a litigant for
using death threats to extort a settlement. ' 26 9 Remarkably, the majority
concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claims as a
sanction for this conduct because it found that the trial court failed to con-
sider lesser sanctions, and the record did not support a presumption that the
plaintiff's claims lacked merit. 270
The propriety of post-trial sanctions for pretrial discovery abuse was at
issue in Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell.271 The supreme court refused to
absolutely bar the imposition of sanctions for discovery abuse that is first
revealed during or after trial. 272 If a party fails to obtain pretrial rulings on
discovery disputes that are known before trial, however, she waives any
259. 850 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1993).
260. 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
261. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d at 180-81.
262. Id. at 181.
263. Id.
264. 856 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
265. Id. at 692-93.
266. 852 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
267. Id. at 591-92.
268. 851 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
269. Id. at 894 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 893. Shook is also significant for its discussion of whether a trial court has the
inherent power to sanction a party for conduct interfering with the judicial process, a proposi-
tion which the majority appeared to doubt. Id. at 890-92.
271. 850 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1993).
272. Id. at 170.
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claim for sanctions based on that conduct. 273 Moreover, a party cannot rely
on her opponent's conduct during trial to support the imposition of discov-
ery sanctions under Rule 215,274 because that rule is addressed only to pre-
trial discovery misconduct. 275 The trial court has its contempt powers
available to it to punish trial misconduct. 276
Finally, the supreme court reversed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals'
decision in Schein v. American Restaurant Group, Inc. ,277 a case discussed in
the 1993 Annual Survey. The supreme court held that sanctions excluding
evidence for failure to properly respond to discovery are intended to pro-
mote settlement and prevent trial by ambush. 278 If the trial is postponed,
the purpose for the sanction is eliminated. 27 9 Accordingly, exclusion sanc-
tions for failure to timely respond to discovery do not survive a nonsuit.280
D. DUTY TO SUPPLEMENT DISCOVERY
As in prior years, the duty to supplement discovery was the subject of
numerous reported decisions during the Survey period. The Texas Supreme
Court emphasized in two cases that the automatic exclusion of witnesses
pursuant to Rule 215(5)281 for failure to timely supplement interrogatory
answers should not be extended beyond its proper purpose. Thus, in H.B.
Zachry Co. v. Gonzalez282 the Court held that the automatic exclusion does
not continue where the trial is postponed for more than thirty days. 283 Simi-
larly, the court held in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Specia 284 that the
automatic exclusion sanction does not survive a nonsuit. 285
Rule 166b(6) 286 requires parties to disclose the substance of an expert wit-
ness's expected testimony no less than thirty days before trial. 287 In Exxon
Corp. v. West Texas Gathering C0. 288 the supreme court clarified that this
rule does not prevent an expert from refining his opinions through the time
of trial.289 The Court indicated, however, that a material alteration of the
expert's testimony within thirty days of trial would lead to exclusion of the
changed testimony just as if the witness had not been disclosed at all.290
273. Id.
274. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.
275. Remington Arms Co., 850 S.W.2d at 171-72.
276. Id. at 172.
277. 828 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992), rev'd, 852 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1993).
278. 852 S.W.2d at 497.
279. Id.
280. Id.; see also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1993)
(holding that sanctions for failure to supplement discovery response do not survive a nonsuit).
281. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
282. 847 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1993).
283. Id. Of course, if the trial court has excluded witnesses based upon some other sanc-
tionable conduct of a party, that ruling may be continued to the next trial setting. Id.
284. 849 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1993).
285. Id. at 807.
286. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
287. Id.
288. 1993 WL 233407 (Tex. June 30, 1993).
289. Id. at *4.
290. Id. at *5.
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First State Bank v. Fatheree29 1 stands for the proposition that witnesses
identified within thirty days of trial are subject to the sanction of automatic
exclusion only when the identification is contained in supplemental discov-
ery responses. The court held that where the defendant first answered inter-
rogatories several days late, and within thirty days of trial, the witnesses
identified in those interrogatory answers did not have to be excluded from
testifying. 292 The court reasoned that Rule 166b(6) 293 imposed no duty to
supplement until the interrogatories were answered, 294 and Rule 215(5)295
addresses only failure to respond or supplement responses to discovery, not
untimely responses. 296
Which party must identify potential witnesses, and in what manner, was
once again a point of contention during the Survey period. The court in
Bullock v. Aluminum Co. of America 2 9 7 held that the defendant could not
call by deposition witnesses that it had failed to identify as either persons
with knowledge of relevant facts or experts, even though the plaintiffs had
designated them. 29 8 In Kreymer v. North Texas Municipal Water District,299
on the other hand, the court concluded that, where both parties designated
an expert witness, both parties should be entitled to cross-examine that ex-
pert on any matters falling within the scope of either party's designation. 3° °
Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc. 301 held that when a potential witness's current
address is properly disclosed, exclusion of that witness's testimony for failure
to provide a telephone number is unwarranted. 30 2
The San Antonio Court of Appeals joined a number of its sister courts in
holding that supplemental answers to interrogatories need not be verified. 30 3
In Varner v. Howe 304 on the other hand, the court stated that a letter identi-
fying a potential witness failed to meet any of the formal requirements of
Rule 168305 and, therefore, was insufficient to be considered a supplemental
answer to interrogatories. 30 6 Accordingly, the court held that the witness
should not have been permitted to testify.30 7 Although the court did not rest
its conclusion on the lack of verification alone, it expressed disagreement
with those courts that have concluded verification of supplemental interro-
291. 847 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
292. Id. at 294.
293. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
294. Id.; see Fatheree, 847 S.W.2d at 394.
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
296. Id.; see Fatheree, 847 S.W.2d at 394; see also Hopkins v. Massey, 862 S.W.2d 679
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, no writ).
297. 843 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted).
298. Id. at 641-43.
299. 842 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
300. Id. at 753.
301. 853 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
302. Id. at 632.
303. Soefje v. Stewart, 847 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
The court further held that supplemental answers need not be signed by the parties. Id.
304. 860 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
305. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.




gatory answers is not required.30 8 The court stated that failing to require
verification would allow a party to hold back material information and then
provide it in an unsworn supplement just before the thirty-day deadline. 30 9
Finally, the Dallas Court of Appeals was called upon to interpret the re-
quirement of Rule 166b(6)(b)3 10 that a party designate its expert witnesses
"as soon as is practical" in Mentis v. Barnard.3 1' The court concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking plaintiffs' expert, who
was first identified thirty-two days before trial, as not being designated as
soon as practical, where the case had been pending for almost two years and
the relevant discovery request had been outstanding for over eighteen
months.31 2 The court noted, however, that there is disagreement over the
meaning of the "as soon as is practical" language among the courts of ap-
peals. 31 3 The supreme court has granted the application for writ of error in
Mentis, and it will presumably provide much needed guidance on the proper
interpretation of this provision.
E. MISCELLANEOUS
The scope of proper discovery was the subject of two unusual cases de-
cided during the Survey period. The first, Keene Corp. v. Wittig3 14 involved
an attempt to discover information about a newspaper advertisement the
corporate defendant placed in a Houston newspaper during jury delibera-
tions in a related lawsuit. 3 5 The advertisement contained opinions of the
defendant's president regarding the wastefulness of asbestos lawsuits and the
large legal fees and awards the defendant had paid.33 6 The plaintiffs argued
that information regarding the motivations behind the advertisement was
relevant to their claim for punitive damages.31 7 The court of appeals dis-
agreed.31 8 Although the court acknowledged that advertisements published
during or shortly before trial in order to affect jury deliberations may be a
legitimate concern, and that the trial court has the power to remedy any
inappropriate conduct of that type, pretrial inquiry into the motivations be-
hind the advertisement is beyond the scope of proper discovery.
319
Martin v. Khoury320 involved a subpoena duces tecum directed to the
president of East Texans Against Lawsuit Abuse, Inc. (ETALA), seeking
the production of ETALA's current membership list and the identity of any-
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6)(b).
311. 853 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ granted).
312. Id. at 123-24.
313. Id. at 124.
314. 855 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
315. Id. at 281.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 283.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 283-84. Because the lack of relevance was dispositive, the court declined to
address the constitutional free speech arguments raised by the defendant. Id. at 282-83.
320. 843 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, orig. proceeding).
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one who had contributed to that organization.32' The parties issuing the
subpoena argued that it was relevant to their voir dire because ETALA had
influenced public opinion regarding personal injury plaintiffs. 322 The trial
court ordered the deponent to produce the requested documents for an in
camera inspection. 323 The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus di-
recting the trial court to withdraw that order.324 The court held that the
requested discovery was improper because it had no relevance to the subject
matter of the lawsuit. 325 In response to plaintiffs' concerns about ETALA's
influence on potential jurors, the court stated that discovery should not be
permitted without a showing that plaintiffs could not obtain the necessary
information by voir dire of the jury panel.326 Moreover, the court expressed
concern regarding the infringement of the First Amendment right to associa-
tion in the absence of some controlling justification for allowing the re-
quested discovery. 327
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Issues relating to summary judgment pleading practice sharply divided
the supreme court in McConnell v. Southside Independent School District.328
The defendant in the case had filed a one page motion for summary judg-
ment to which it attached a twelve page supporting brief. The defendant's
brief expressly presented the grounds on which judgment was sought, but its
motion stated only that there were " 'no genuine issues as to any material
facts.' "329 Although plaintiff filed a written exception to the motion on the
basis that it failed to present any grounds, the trial court overruled the ex-
ception and rendered summary judgment for the defendant. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 166a330 allows a movant to "set out the
specific grounds for summary judgment in a brief served ... contemporane-
ously with the motion itself."'331
The supreme court reversed this judgment in a 5-4 decision, holding that
the grounds for a motion for summary judgment must be set out in the mo-
tion itself and cannot be furnished by an accompanying brief.332 The Court
observed that this requirement is plainly stated in the rule333 and does not
unduly burden the movant.334 A plurality of the Court also noted that carv-
321. Id. at 164-65.
322. Id. at 165.
323. Id. at 164.
324. Id. at 167.
325. Id. at 166.
326. Id. at 166-67.
327. Id. at 167.
328. 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993).
329. Id. at 338.
330. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a.
331. 814 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991) (per curiam), rey'd, 858 S.W.2d 337
(Tex. 1993).
332. 858 S.W.2d at 341.
333. Id. at 339; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ("The motion for summary judgment shall
state the specific grounds therefore.").
334. 858 S.W.2d at 341.
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ing exceptions to this simple requirement would frustrate the purpose of the
rule and inject uncertainty into summary judgment proceedings as to what
issues were presented for consideration.3 3 5 In a vigorous dissent, two jus-
tices advocated a "more flexible" approach that would at least permit a mo-
vant to specify his grounds for summary judgment by reference to other
documents so long as the opposing party was provided adequate information
to oppose the motion and the summary judgment issues were defined. 3 6
The rest of the plurality opinion concerns corollary questions about the
non-movants' response and whether objections to a defective motion or re-
sponse are required to preserve error.3 37 According to the plurality opinion,
non-movants must likewise set out in their written response the issues they
assert in avoidance of the motion, and they cannot present those issues
merely by reference to the summary judgment evidence. 3 8 The opinion also
states that a non-movant need not object or except to a motion presenting no
grounds as a predicate for appeal.3 39 Instead, an exception is required only
if the non-movant intends to complain on appeal that the grounds stated in
the motion were unclear or ambiguous. 34° The plurality opinion announces
similar rules governing the movants' objections to the written answer or re-
sponse.3 4 1 A majority of the Court refused to join in these latter portions of
the plurality opinion, however, and they appear to be mere dicta.
In E.B. Smith Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 34 2 the court
held that a party does not comply with the requirements of amended Rule
166a(d), 343 which governs the use of unfiled discovery instruments as evi-
dence, by simply filing a notice identifying deposition excerpts by name and
page numbers. 3 " Instead, a party must provide the trial court with the ac-
tual language he is relying on from the unfiled deposition or other discovery
document. 345 The court opined that the amended rule does permit a party
who appropriately specifies the unfiled discovery to rely on these materials
335. Id.
336. Id. at 345 (Hecht, J., dissenting). This dissenting opinion also took the majority to
task for failing to address whether the trial court's purported mistake constituted reversible
error under TEX. R. App. P. 184(b). Id. at 347.
In a separate opinion, the remaining two dissenters agreed with the majority that TEX. R.
Civ. P. 166a(c) established a bright line rule that was not followed in the trial court. Id. at 349
(Enoch, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, they agreed with their brethren dissenters that the error
was harmless. Id. at 350.
337. Id. at 341-43.
338. Id. at 341.
339. Id. at 342. Even if the motion specifies some grounds, an exception is not required to
preserve a complaint that the motion did not present the grounds upon which the court relied
in granting summary judgment. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 343.
342. 850 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
343. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(d), which was added by amendment in 1990, provides, in perti-
nent part: "[d]iscovery products not on file with the clerk may be used as summary judgment
evidence if ... a notice containing specific references to the discovery ... [is] filed and served
on all parties together with a statement of intent to use the specified discovery as summary
judgment proofs .... "




without attaching them to an affidavit, the motion for summary judgment,
or a written response. 346 This latter statement by the court is arguably dic-
tum, however, and possibly conflicts with earlier decisions by the same
court347 and others348 that have held that the Deerfield 349 authentication
rules for unfiled discovery materials survived the 1990 amendments to Rule
166a.
Two other cases decided during the Survey period also involved issues of
summary judgment evidence. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Moore350 the court held that movants may not rely on their own answers to
interrogatories35' or depositions filed less than twenty-one days before the
hearing 352 as evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment. In
Coleman v. United Savings Association 323 the court refused to disregard an
affidavit in which the affiant made a statement based on "knowledge and
belief' instead of "personal knowledge. ' 354 According to the court, the re-
quirement in Rule 166a 355 that affidavits be made on personal knowledge is
satisfied by an affirmative showing in the affidavit of how the affiant became
familiar with the facts and not by a self-serving recitation that the affiant has
"personal knowledge." 356
CBI Industries, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 357 involved a
discovery issue of a different stripe. The defendant insurance company filed
a motion for summary judgment on the basis of a provision in its policy that
allegedly excluded coverage for plaintiff's environmental claims. The trial
court granted the motion on the grounds that this exclusionary "pollution"
clause was clear and unambiguous. The plaintiff argued that the language of
the policy was at least latently ambiguous, 358 and that the trial court should
have permitted it to proceed with discovery before granting the summary
judgment. Agreeing that the plaintiff had not been given a reasonable op-
portunity for discovery, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and re-
manded the case to the trial court without deciding whether the exclusion
was ambiguous. 359 The court emphasized that Rule 166a(c) 36° clearly con-
346. Id.
347. See Prowse v. Schellhase, 838 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
348. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. King, 810 S.W.2d 772, 773-74 (Tex. App.-Amarillo), writ
denied per curiarn, 816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1991) (discussed in Ernest E. Figari, A. Erin Dwyer,
& Don Colleluori, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 SMU L. REV. 73,
91-92 (1991).
349. See Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co., 758 S.W.2d 608, 610
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
350. 846 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
351. Id. at 496.
352. Id. at 495.
353. 846 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
354. Id. at 131.
355. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f).
356. 846 S.W.2d at 131.
357. 860 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
358. A latent ambiguity arises from extraneous or collateral facts that make the meaning of
a written instrument uncertain although its language is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 665.
359. Id. at 664.
360. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
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templates that the trial court allow a reasonable opportunity for discovery
before granting a summary judgment. 361 Given the unique and complex is-
sues presented in the case, the court concluded that the six months that had
elapsed between commencement of the suit and entry of the judgment was
an insufficient period for plaintiff to conduct adequate discovery addressed to
the issue of latent ambiguity. 362
XII. JURY QUESTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the difference between "defective"
and "immaterial" jury questions in Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of
America.363 The trial court in Spencer submitted a jury question, over the
defendant's objection, asking whether the defendant had engaged in an
" 'unfair practice in the business of insurance.' 364 The jury answered this
question affirmatively, but the trial court disregarded the finding and entered
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 365 The court of appeals affirmed.366
The supreme court agreed with both lower courts that the question was de-
fective because, without an accompanying instruction, it failed to specify the
actions for which the defendant could be held liable.367 Because the ques-
tion plainly attempted to secure a finding on a statutory cause of action,
however, the Court held that it was not immaterial. 368 Thus, the defendant
was entitled only to a new trial and not the judgment notwithstanding the
verdict granted by the trial court. 369
The supreme court has emphasized in recent years the mandatory nature
of Rule 277,370 which requires cases to be submitted to the jury on broad-
form questions whenever feasible. 37 1 In H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner,372
however, the Court held that the failure to submit a properly tendered
broad-form question and accompanying instructions did not constitute
harmful error.373 The Court stated that, although submitted in granulated
form, the questions to the jury set forth the proper elements of the plaintiffs'
cause of action.3
74
361. 860 S.W.2d at 665.
362. Id. at 665-66.
363. 860 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. 1993).
364. Id. at 869-70.
365. Id. at 870.
366. Id.
367. Id.; see also Adams v. Valley Fed. Credit Union, 848 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (stating that instructions are even more important when
broad form submissions are used).
368. Spencer, 860 S.W.2d at 870.
369. Id.
370. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
371. Id.
372. 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1992).
373. Id. at 260.
374. Id. Compare Westgate, Ltd. v. State of Texas, 843 S.W.2d 448, 457-58 (Tex. 1992)
(where failure to utilize broad-form questions produced a demonstrably different damage fig-




In a case that could affect Texas state court procedure, the Fifth Circuit
held in United States v. Broussard375 that Batson v. Kentucky, 376 which pro-
hibits racial discrimination in the use of peremptory jury strikes, 377 does not
extend to gender-based discrimination.3 7 8 The court reasoned that racial
discrimination is at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that gender
has not been considered a suspect classification entitled to the same degree of
protection as race. 379
The Texas Supreme Court considered the right to a jury trial in
Rivercenter Associates v. Rivera.3 80 The plaintiff in that case sought to strike
the defendants' jury demand based upon a jury waiver provision in the con-
tracts upon which suit was brought.38' When the trial court denied the mo-
tion, the plaintiff sought mandamus relief.382 The supreme court held that
the plaintiff had not shown that it diligently pursued its right to a non-jury
trial in light of the passage of over four months between the filing of the
defendants' jury demand and the plaintiff's motion to strike.383 The Court
did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of contractual jury waivers.3 84
The necessity and timeliness of objections were at issue in Martinez v. City
of Austin 385 and Roling v. Alamo Group (USA), Inc.3 8 6 In Martinez the
plaintiffs objected after the jury had been sworn that a "systemic bias" de-
nied them sufficient minority representation on the jury. 38 7 The court held
that this objection came too late.3 8 The Roling court held that, as in the
case of an incomplete jury verdict, an objection must be made to conflicting
jury findings in order to preserve error. 38 9
XIV. JUDGMENT, DISMISSAL, AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The Dallas Court of Appeals reconciled two lines of cases dealing with the
effect of a second judgment being entered in a single cause in Azbill v. Dallas
County Child Protective Services.390 The court held that, unless the record
shows that the trial court intended to vacate the first judgment entered and
replace it with the second judgment, the latter is a nullity.39'
375. 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993).
376. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
377. Id. at 89. The Supreme Court extended Batson to civil suits in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
378. Broussard, 987 F.2d at 217.
379. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
380. 858 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1993).
381. Id. at 367.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at n.2.
385. 852 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
386. 840 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, writ denied).
387. Martinez, 852 S.W.2d at 73.
388. Id.
389. Roling, 840 S.W.2d at 109-10.
390. 860 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
391. Id. at 139.
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Careful trial practitioners should make note of Lowe v. United States Shoe
Corp.,392 which addressed the constitutional sufficiency of a notice of intent
to dismiss for want of prosecution. The trial court in Lowe sent a notice that
failed to specify what cases would be dismissed although a list was posted at
the courthouse and available for a nominal fee from the district clerk.
393
The court of appeals held that the failure to identify the cases to be dismissed
by name did not render the notice constitutionally defective.
394
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the proper interpretation of Rule
306a(4) 395 in Levit v. Adams.396 Rule 306a(4) extends the thirty-day period
for filing post-judgment motions when a party does not receive notice of a
judgment or dismissal within twenty days such that the period begins on the
date the party does receive notice, but in no event more than ninety days
after the original judgment or dismissal order was signed.397 The supreme
court noted that the courts of appeals had disagreed over how this rule ap-
plied when a party learned of a judgment or dismissal between the 90th and
120th days after it was entered. 398 The Court concluded that, correctly in-
terpreted, the rule does not provided that the ninetieth day itself will trigger
the thirty-day filing period; thus, the thirty-day period cannot begin to run if
the party receives notice more than ninety days following the entry of the
judgment or order of dismissal. 399
The similarities and differences between motions to reinstate and motions
for new trial were explored in Carrera v. Marsh 400 and Brim Laundry Ma-
chinery Co. v. Washex Machinery Corp. 401 In Carrera the court held that an
unverified motion for new trial filed during the extended period allowed
under Rule 306a(4) 40 2 was not sufficient to reinvoke the trial court's plenary
jurisdiction.4° 3 The court based its holding on decisions requiring verifica-
tion of motions to reinstate. 4°4 On the other hand, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that a premature motion to reinstate would not be deemed filed
subsequent to the signing of the order of dismissal as would a motion for
new trial under Rule 306c, 405 notwithstanding the similarities between the
two types of motions.40 6
The Texas Supreme Court addressed a number of procedural issues sur-
rounding motions for new trial during the Survey period. The Court held in
392. 849 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
393. Id. at 889.
394. Id. at 891.
395. TEx. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
396. 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993).
397. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
398. Levit, 850 S.W.2d at 470 (citations omitted).
399. Id. at 470.
400. 847 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
401. 854 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
402. TEX. R. COv. P. 306a(4).
403. Carrera, 847 S.W.2d at 342.
404. Id. at 341-43.
405. TEX. R. Cv. P. 306c.
406. Brim Laundry Machinery Co., 854 S.W.2d at 301.
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Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo4°7 that a trial court has the authority during the
75-day period after a judgment is entered to vacate an order for new trial
that it had previously entered. 40 8 Where a new trial order is vacated and the
original judgment reinstated, however, the Court held in Old Republic Insur-
ance Co. v. Scott 4°9 that the appellate timetable begins anew.410 Finally, the
Court concluded in Horrocks v. Texas Department of Transportation 41  that
an appellate court cannot render judgment based on a no evidence point that
was preserved solely in a party's motion for new trial. 412
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives a court discretionary power
to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends of
justice would be better served if another court heard the action. Three years
ago, the supreme court held in Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro413 that the legis-
lature had statutorily abolished the doctrine in suits brought under section
71.031414 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.415 The dissenting
justices in Dow expressed fears that the Court's holding would transform
Texas into an irresistible forum of last resort for all mass disaster lawsuits. 416
The legislature has now eliminated those concerns by amending the Texas
wrongful death statute.41 7 Section 71.051 of the statute permits the court to
decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens if a case
brought by a non-resident of the United States would be more properly
heard in another forum.418 Under the amended statute, the doctrine also
applies in certain circumstances to cases filed by U.S. residents. 419
B. SUBPOENA RANGE
A newly enacted amendment to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code extends the subpoena range for witnesses to 150 miles.420 Moreover, it
appears this distance is to be measured from the county line rather than the
location of the courthouse.42' Prior to this legislative enactment, a subpoena
407. 848 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993).
408. Id. at 84.
409. 846 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1993).
410. Id. at 833.
411. 852 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1993).
412. Id. at 498-99.
413. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991).
414. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986) provides that actions
for wrongful death or personal injury arising from events in foreign states or countries may be
brought in Texas under certain circumstances.
415. 786 S.W.2d at 678-79.
416. Id. at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
417. Act of March 4, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 4, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. II (Vernon).
418. Id. (codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(a) (Supp. 1994)).
419. Id. § 71.051(b).
420. Act of May 7, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 103, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 193




could be issued under Rule 176 only for a witness who resided within one
hundred miles of the courthouse in which the suit was pending. 422
C. MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS
In Elbaor v. Smith 423 the supreme court announced that Mary Carter
agreements are "unwise and champertous device[s] that... [have] failed to
achieve... [their] intended purpose. ' 424 Although various courts have de-
fined the term "Mary Carter agreement" in different fashions, 425 the Elbaor
court clarified that a Mary Carter agreement exists whenever a settling de-
fendant retains a financial stake in the plaintiff's recovery and remains a
party at the trial of the case. 426 This type of arrangement, said the court,
creates a tremendous incentive for the settling defendant to assist the plain-
tiff's presentation of his case. 427 Moreover, rather than promote settlement,
a Mary Carter agreement frequently makes litigation inevitable by granting
the settling defendant a veto power over any proposed settlement between
the plaintiff and the remaining defendants. 428  Although the Court an-
nounced guidelines for use in Mary Carter scenarios six years ago hoping to
prevent the harmful skewing of the trial process caused by these agree-
ments, 4 29 the Elbaor Court decided that these remedial measures did not
eliminate the agreements' unjust influences.430 The Court therefore held
that Mary Carter agreements are void as against public policy,43' and the
Court agreed belatedly with Justice Spears' concurrence in Smithwick that
"'they are inimical to the adversary system, and they do not promote settle-
ment-their primary justification.' "432 Due to considerations of fairness
and policy, however, the Court limited its holding to cases already in the
judicial pipeline and those tried on or after December 2, 1992.433
422. TEx. R. Civ. P. 176.
423. 845 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1992).
424. Id. at 249.
425. Id. at 247 n.13. Compare General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
1977) (agreement exists where settling defendant retains financial interest and remains a
party), overruled on other grounds by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.
1984) with Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1978) (agreement is
settlement where settling defendant retains financial interest in plaintiff's recovery).
426. 845 S.W.2d at 247. The agreement need not expressly require the settling defendant
to participate at trial; the participation requirement is satisfied by the continued presence of the
settling defendant as a party in the case. Id. at 247 n. 14.
427. Id. at 247.
428. Id. at 248.
429. See Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 9-11 (Tex. 1986) (Spears, J.,
concurring).
430. 845 S.W.2d at 249-50.
431. Id. at 250.
432. Id. at 248 (quoting from Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1986)
(Spears, J., concurring)).
433. 845 S.W.2d at 251. Although supreme court decisions usually apply retrospectively,
exceptions are recognized when considerations of fairness and policy dictate prospective effect
only. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 434 (Tex. 1984).
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D. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
Except in limited circumstances, rule 3.08(a) of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from acting as both a
lawyer and a witness in the same case. 434 In Mauze v. Curry 4 35 the attorney
for the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action signed an affidavit controverting
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Because plaintiff's counsel
thereby effectively "testified" as an expert witness in the case, the supreme
court in Mauze held that the lawyer was disqualified from further represen-
tation of the plaintiff.436
E. APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
Rule 173437 authorizes the appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect
a minor's interest during litigation. The Court in McGough v. First Court of
Appeals 438 held that the rule does not restrict the timing of the appointment,
and that a trial court had not abused its discretion by appointing a second
guardian ad litem in a case following its entry of judgment. 439 The Court
pointed out that a guardian ad litem may have usefulness at all stages of a
case, not just the trial." 0
434. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.08(a) (1989), reprinted in TEX. Gov'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon Supp. 1992) (STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9).
435. 861 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1993).
436. Id. at 870.
437. TEX. R. Civ. P. 173.
438. 842 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1992).
439. Id. at 640.
440. Id.
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